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Information and Analysis on Legal Aspects of Procurement
Focus
¶ 51





of	 the	 federal	procurement	 system.	 I	was	greatly	
honored	to	be	nominated	by	the	president	in	Octo-
ber	2009,	and	confirmed	by	the	Senate	in	November	
2009.	More	 than	20	 years	 of	work	 in	 the	 federal	
procurement	law	field,	first	in	private	practice	and	
then	at	the	Government	Accountability	Office,	pro-
vided	me	with	 the	 advantage	 of	 familiarity	with	
the	procurement	system	and	with	many	of	the	key	
stakeholders,	especially	the	attorneys.	
By	 the	 time	 I	 was	 sworn	 in,	 shortly	 after	
Thanksgiving	2009,	the	administration	had	already	
issued	a	number	of	significant	procurement-related	
documents.	While	 those	 documents	 reflected	 a	
range	of	policies,	 I	viewed	my	key	goals	as	 three	
in	number:	 strengthen	 the	acquisition	workforce,	










nor	 do	 I	 believe	 that	 our	 regulations	 require	 a	
major	 rewrite.	 On	 the	 contrary:	Observing	 the	
legal	reforms	in	other	countries,	whether	it	is	the	
EU’s	proposal	 to	revamp	 its	Procurement	Direc-
tive	 or	 the	World	Trade	 Organization’s	 newly	
revised	Agreement	on	Government	Procurement,	
I	am	struck	by	how	fundamentally	sound	our	le-
gal	 framework	 is	and	how	 little	 legal	 reform	we	
need.	That	is	not	to	say	that	the	Federal	Acquisi-
tion	Regulation	 cannot	 be	 improved—I	 remain	
concerned,	for	example,	about	the	adequacy	of	the	
FAR’s	guidance	on	blanket	purchase	agreements	
and	 task	 orders—but	 the	 federal	 procurement	
system	does	not	require	a	massive	revision	along	
the	lines	of	what	was	done	in	the	1990s.
Contrary	 to	 some	 people’s	 hopes,	 I	 also	 did	
not	view	insourcing	as	a	goal.	While,	as	explained	












sity	Law	School	 repeatedly	chronicled	 this	 trend.	




force,”	 47	GC	¶	 204.	One	 of	 the	most	 thorough	
analyses	of	 the	 impact	of	 that	decline	on	 the	na-
tion’s	defense	capabilities	was	that	led	by	Professor	
Jacques	Gansler,	former	undersecretary	of	defense	
for	 acquisition,	 technology	and	 logistics	 and	now	
at	the	University	of	Maryland.	Urgent Reform Re-
quired: Army Expeditionary Contracting,	Report	of	
the	Commission	on	Army	Acquisition	and	Program	
Management	 in	Expeditionary	Operations	 (Oct.	
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Moreover,	 the	 decline	was	 not	 limited	 to	 the	
personnel	 in	 the	 agencies’	 contracting	 offices	 (the	
people	 in	 the	 1102	 job	 series).	Virtually	 every	key	
role	 in	 acquisition	planning,	 as	well	 as	 in	 contract	
management,	was	 overstretched,	undertrained	and	
undervalued.	To	 give	 one	 specific,	 but	 very	 impor-
tant,	 example:	During	my	 tenure	as	administrator,	
I	consistently	heard	concern	that	both	defense	and	





dramatically	 expanded	 reliance	 on	 contractors	was	
the	failure	to	appoint	and	train	enough	contracting	
officer’s	representatives	or	CO’s	technical	represen-
tatives.	Those	 officials	 represent	 the	Government	







of	 the	COR	 function,	 particularly	 in	 the	 context	 of	
overseas	work.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Commission	 on	Wartime	
Contracting	 in	Afghanistan	and	 Iraq	 (CWC),	Final 
Report to Congress: Transforming Wartime Contract-
ing: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks	(August	2011)	
at	 162–63;	Dickinson,	Outsourcing	War	and	Peace:	
Preserving	Public	Values	 in	 a	World	 of	Privatized	
Foreign	Affairs	(2011)	at	82–86.	
Increasing Fiscal Responsibility—This	 pri-








12	 percent	 per	 year	 between	2001	 and	2009—was	
unsustainable.	Moreover,	 the	 increased	 spending	




more,	we	had	 shifted	 from	 individual	 procurement	
contracts	to	the	use	of	indefinite-delivery,	indefinite-
quantity	 contracts,	 frequently	 awarded	 to	multiple	
contractors	and	often	used	by	multiple	agencies.	The	
General	 Services	Administration’s	Federal	 Supply	








task	 and	delivery	 orders	 under	 them.	But	 at	 that	









goods	 to	 buying	mainly	 services.	Buying	 services,	







Developed	 for	 reasons	outside	 the	scope	of	 this	
FeaTure CommenT,	BPAs	became	a	new	layer	between	
the	FSS	contracts	and	the	individual	task	and	deliv-
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Rebalancing Relations between the Gov-
ernment and Contractors—In	 the	 years	 since	
1992,	 relations	 between	 the	Government	 and	 its	
contractors	 had	 changed	 dramatically	 and,	 in	 our	
judgment,	gotten	badly	out	of	balance.	One	example	
is	 the	weakness	 of	 the	Government’s	management	
of	its	contractors,	noted	above,	but	there	were	more	







Since	 the	mid-1990s,	 an	 enormous	 amount	 of	
work	that	historically	had	been	performed	by	civil	
servants	was	outsourced	 to	 contractors.	While	 the	
decision	to	outsource	was	sometimes	based	on	solid	
analysis,	 in	many	 cases	 it	was	 driven	 by	 ideology	
(some	believed	that	contractors	were	by	definition	
less	expensive	or	more	efficient),	or	by	all-too-prac-







But	whatever	 the	 reason,	 the	Federal	Govern-
ment	had	come	to	depend	on	contractors—at	home,	
but	also	in	Iraq,	Afghanistan	and	elsewhere	overseas.	





agency’s	 contracting	 office	 telling	me,	 in	 a	mix	 of	







Coupled	with	 these	 problems,	 though,	 I	 also	
heard	repeatedly	about	a	breakdown	in	communica-
tion	 between	 the	Government	 and	 contractors.	 In	
many	cases,	I	heard	that	the	acquisition	profession-
als	were	uncertain	how	to	interact	with	contractors.	













did	 that	 in	 abundance.	For	 example,	 the	 priorities	
set	out	above,	and	potential	ways	to	address	them,	
were	discussed	in	meetings	of	the	Chief	Acquisition	

















outside	Baltimore,	Md.,	whether	 at	 large	 agencies	
or	small	ones,	the	discussions	were	a	chance	to	hear	
from	people	on	the	front	line	and	to	get	their	input.







ment	 contractors.	Meeting	with	 other	 stakeholders	
was	a	routine	part	of	my	job,	including	(but,	as	they	
say,	not	 limited	 to)	members	 of	Congress	and	 their	










the	 three	 priorities	 set	 out	 above.	But	 there	were,	
of	course,	other	issues	along	the	way,	some	of	them	
very	 important,	 such	 as	 increasing	 small	 business	
participation	in	the	federal	marketplace.	Other	issues	
were	frustrating	distractions,	such	as	responding	to	
efforts	 on	 the	Hill	 to	 legislate	 automatic,	 punitive	
debarment	of	contractors	for	various	reasons.	While	
our	work	was	 sometimes	used	by	 stakeholders	 for	
parochial	 purposes—to	 trash	 the	 federal	workforce	
or	 bash	 contractors,	 depending	 on	 the	 individual	
stakeholder’s	agenda—we	tried	to	stay	focused	on	our	
priorities	throughout.
Progress Made in Strengthening the Ac-
quisition Workforce—Although	 the	progress	was	
limited	and	 the	 outlook	 remains	problematic,	 I	 be-

























federal	hiring,	 I	 am	 concerned	 that	we	will	 repeat	
the	mistake	of	the	past	and	let	the	number	of	1102s	
go	 down	 again.	There	 is	 some	 comfort	 in	 hearing	


























to	 improving	 training.	 In	 addition,	 other	 agencies	
have	 also	 improved	 their	 training	 capability,	most	
notably	the	Department	of	Veterans	Affairs,	with	its	
Acquisition	Academy	in	Frederick,	Md.	The	challenge	
will	be	 to	ensure	that	all	of	 those	 facilities	provide	
training	 that	 is	well-designed,	 relevant	and	 timely.	
Some	 of	 the	 course	material	 that	 I	 saw	was	 quite	
good,	and	the	heightened	emphasis	on	having	useful	





















taxpayer	 funds	 spent	 on	 contracts	 each	 year—but,	



























shifted	 too	much	 cost	 risk	 to	 the	Government.	We	


























that	 spending	 on	 these	 services	warranted	 further	
attention,	for	several	reasons.	
First,	 they	were	 an	 area	 of	 particularly	 fast	
growth—the	 rate	 of	 increase	 in	 spending	 on	 them	
exceeded	the	already	rapid	increase	in	contract	spend-
ing	generally.	Second,	contracts	for	these	services	are	
frequently	 structured	 as	T&M	 contracts,	with	 the	
associated	 cost	 risk	 to	 the	Government.	And	 third,	
when	we	asked	agency	personnel	to	identify	services	
for	which	they	were	concerned	about	overreliance	on	
contractors,	 these	 services	were	 often	named.	The	










related	 to	 interagency	 contracting.	The	 fact	 is	 that	
when	multiple	agencies	buy	the	same	goods	or	ser-
vices	on	their	own,	there	is	a	great	risk	that	they	are	


















largely	 been	addressed.	 I	was	 especially	 concerned	
about	a	misunderstanding	that	arose	repeatedly	 in	
discussions	 about	 duplication,	 an	 issue	mentioned	
in	connection	with	interagency	contracting	in	more	
recent	GAO	reports.	While	having	 two	or	 three	 in-
teragency	 contracts	 for	 similar	 goods	 and	 services	
might	 represent	 some	duplication,	 replacing	 those	
 The Government Contractor ®
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contracts	with	 20	 or	more	 single-agency	 contracts	





Perhaps	 the	most	 notable	 demonstration	 dur-
ing	my	tenure	as	OFPP	administrator	of	our	efforts	
to	 promote	 the	 use	 of	 interagency	 vehicles	 rather	
than	single-agency	ones	was	the	campaign	referred	

















described	 in	more	detail	 than	 is	 possible	here,	 the	
bottom	line	was	this:	GSA	ultimately	awarded	a	suite	
of	15	BPAs,	13	of	which	went	to	small	businesses.	We	






million	during	FY	2011.	 In	 the	 small	but	not	 insig-














Putting	 these	 strategic	 sourcing	 efforts	 in	 a	
broader	context,	I	would	say	that	during	my	tenure	
we	witnessed	agencies	doing	more	by	way	 of	 inno-
vation	 to	buy	 smarter	 than	we	have	 seen	 in	many	




deserves.	See	Federal Contracting: OMB’s Acquisition 























Progress Made in Rebalancing the Govern-
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the	line	between	inherently	governmental	functions	
and	those	 that	can	properly	be	 turned	over	 to	con-
tractors.	More	importantly,	the	policy	letter	provided	
extensive	management	direction	to	agencies	on	how	





















Government’s	 interests	 going	 forward,	 and	 talking	
about	 them	 should	 be	 constructive.	Yet	 time	 and	
again,	I	found	myself	having	to	respond	to	politically	
charged	 efforts	 to	 promote	 automatic	 ineligibility	
for	firms	with	 one	 or	 another	 strike	against	 them.	



















































This Feature Comment was written for the Gov-
ernment ContraCtor by Daniel I. Gordon, former 
Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, 
now Associate Dean for Government Procure-
ment Law at The George Washington University 
Law School. 
